Abstract: At a time of rising stress for communities, families and individuals coupled with a growing disillusionment with government,
together in a spirit of neighbourliness and solidarity, we can improve both our own lives and those around us. As the former Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern 4 puts it, At the heart of active citizenship is that sense of shared values, of belonging to the community and of pride in our place and our country…It [active citizenship] is accepting a responsibility to help others and being happy to contribute to improve the quality of life of those less fortunate than ourselves.
5
This particular discourse has been vigorously promoted by state and select civic actors alike through a wide-ranging active citizenship campaign conducted by a Task Force of select state and civic actors appointed by Bertie Ahern in April 2006 for this purpose. Narrowly equating active citizenship with volunteering and 'helping out' in local communities, this campaign has gained considerable momentum as it has percolated through towns, villages and communities throughout the country.
Active citizenship, as promoted through this campaign calls us to action in solidarity with those most marginalised. All well and good. However, something is missing.
While, through the agency of community development, active citizenship aims at mobilising local communities to 'volunteer and help out' (Taskforce, 2007a: 6), it does not aim at mobilising them to query, question and analyse why this is necessary.
While we are told that 'we cannot afford to ignore the pressures brought by modern lifestyles and the consumer culture' 6 , the reasons for these pressures are not up for discussion.
While wholeheartedly agreeing with the concept's central tenets of the need for engaged and active communities, this paper argues that the concept of active citizenship, as it is contemporaneously promoted and understood, constitutes a highly selective rendering of the interrelated concepts of citizenship, social capital and community development. Specifically, it is argued that a conceptual revisioning has occurred, where active citizenship is employed in a manner which encourages 4 Taoiseach (Prime Minister) from 1997-2008. 5 Speech by an Taoiseach, Mr Bertie Ahern TD, at the first regional seminar of the Taskforce [on active citizenship] (nd), http://www.activecitizenship.ie/index.asp?locID=12&docID=52, accessed January 5 th , 2009. 6 Idem.
communities to overcome growing deficits in infrastructure and services without questioning the reasons for these. Put differently, it substitutes self-help for redistribution, self-reliance for state accountability, in the process contributing towards an ongoing depoliticisation of the principles and practice of community development and affording 'ordinary' people little say over the direction of their country and their lives. Moreover, in glossing over the contradictions and conflicts inherent in communities, it is argued that active citizenship, as it is currently promulgated, negates the possibility that community actions of 'volunteering and helping out', while benefiting one section of the community, may well lead to the exclusion and further marginalisation of others.
While this paper focuses specifically on the Irish context, its central argument -which highlights more broadly accepted narrow conceptions of the core associated concept of social capital -has significance far beyond Ireland. In an increasingly polarised world, where people marginalisation and alienation at political, as well as social and economic levels is on the rise, there is a need to critically interrogate concepts and strategies which seek to dilute peoples' voices and power over the directions and courses of their lives.
The argument is developed as follows. First, tracing the dominant discourse of active citizenship associated with the work of the Task Force from 2006 to the present, I demonstrate its highly apolitical nature with its narrow focus on harnessing voluntary endeavour whilst seeking to build goodwill and neighbourly solidarity within local communities. I then go on to explore the theoretical origins and developments of the three core concepts of 'citizenship', 'social capital' and 'community development'.
On the concept of citizenship, I highlight the balance between rights and duties, and note that traditions emphasising duties include an explicitly political dimension, affording people a voice in decisions and choices affecting their future. Returning to the seminal but now often ignored work of Pierre Bourdieu on social capital, I reintroduce the issue of power and highlight how social capital possessed by one section of a community can serve to marginalise others. Having thus highlighted the highly selective appropriation and promotion of these three core concepts, I then go on to explore the context for this revisioning. Resituating the local (communities) within the global and, drawing on both the Irish state's own vision of community development and Manuel Castells' theorisation of a 'network state', I argue that active citizenship, as it is currently popularly promulgated, constitutes a mechanism through which the state, facing challenges to its legitimacy as its role in maintaining existing levels of social protection is undermined, attempts to rebuild public legitimacy and support employing the active citizenship project through the aegis of community development. I conclude by arguing that, at a time when the significant failings of the globalised 'growth and competitiveness at all costs' development model are clear to all, there is a need for community development actors and activists to recolonise the space offered by active citizenship, re-inserting power and politics into the spirit and practice of community development and recovering their voices in articulating the contours and directions of their futures and that of their communities.
Depoliticising community development: State and civic discourses on active citizenship and community development
The Irish state has long seen community development as an apolitical space devoted to the nurturing of local self-help and self-reliance (this is clearly laid out in the White Paper on the community and voluntary sector published in 2000 -see Ireland 2000: 23) . This view has found considerable institutional support from within the community and voluntary sector with a wide range of partnership arrangements bringing attractive financial reward to select civic actors. The more recent active citizenship campaign represents yet another step in this process. Enveloped in a powerful ideological cloak embodying all that is good and wholesome, it proves perhaps even more potent than the financial inducements targeted at more formalised groups heretofore. Being also more cost-effective than financial support, its tentacles have spread widely across all levels of society. (Task Force, 2006: 2)
The definition of active citizenship which follows within this key paper, mirroring that within a broader concept paper produced thereafter ( This political dimension is critical and much contemporary civic republican writing promotes deliberative forms of democracy -political fora where people come together to debate and exchange views on diverse conceptions of the 'public good' (see Cohen, 1989 , Habermas, 1990 , Fishkin and Laslett, 2003 . Thus citizenship, in its manifold theoretical forms, embodies a distinct political dimension. Primary among the many rights encompassed within the concept, is the right of individuals and communities to participate and have a voice in plans, strategies and decisions affecting their futures.
Social capital: 'Missing link' or instrument of exclusion?
Heralded by one World Bank expert as 'the missing link in development' (Grootaert, 1998) Putnam's concept of social capital has attracted some harsh critiques however. First, it is argued that the concept of social capital and the closely related idea of trust serve to de-politicise social relations and the development context. Harriss (2002) (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1996: 76) . Thus, the possession or otherwise of 'stocks' of social capital defines the social position of actors and hence their control over social resources (see also Bourdieu, 1986) . Consequently social capital can produce and/or reproduce social inequality, both in material terms and ideologically.
The second main charge fuelled against popular conceptions of social capital highlights its failure to critically engage with dominant socio-economic norms. It is argued that introducing social capital as the solution to development ills draws attention away from the economic and social policies that cause those ills, thereby leaving the underlying framework intact. Economist Ben Fine, bemoaning the incursion of economics into the social sciences, argues that 'the reintroduction of the social has the troubling dual aspect both of rhetorically smoothing the acceptance of at most marginally altered economic policies and of broadening the scope of justifiable intervention from the economic to the social in order to ensure policies are successful ' (2001: 20) . A similar point is made within an Irish context by Powell and Geoghegan (2004) who stress that it is important to connect civic engagement with democratic inclusion in the public sphere. They argue that, while democracy is the voice of society, social capital is conceptually disconnected from it. This brings us to the third element in the conceptual triad -community development and its role vis-à-vis active citizenship.
Community development: consensus, conflict or something in between?
Community development in Ireland certainly defies many attempts at classification, in both its origins and its development. Shaw (2008: 26) , speaking of community development in the UK, notes that 'the contradictory provenance of community development with its roots in both benevolent welfare paternalism and autonomous working class struggle has created a curiously hybrid practice, which has awkwardly (and sometimes unconvincingly) embodied both of these meanings simultaneously'.
Such complexity also characterises the Irish community development terrain where a dichotomy is also apparent with, on the one hand, a range of more professionalised groups acting in partnership with the state as its 'softer arm', providing a range of local services in attempts to mitigate the social fallout of the Celtic Tiger, and, on the other, more radical, transformatory groups seeking to transform the very structures and processes that give rise to this fallout. A third, less visible category may also be identified across the country however. Not necessarily linked to any formal, externally-funded groups, this category comprises the more 'ordinary' people, the self-organisers who, with a quiet determination, yet sometimes a palpable frustration and anger at significant developmental shortcomings, are busy redressing redistributive failures and inequalities within their own communities. These are the local sports club leaders, the 'new community' leaders, the youth club coordinators etc…, and it is at these people, community developers in a very real sense, that the active citizenship campaign, promoted on an ideological rather than financial basisand all the more potent for that -appears specifically targeted.
As promoted and promulgated by state and select civic actors alike, the active citizenship campaign therefore entails a conceptual revisioning of the allied concepts of citizenship, social capital and community development, neatly glossing over the conflicts and contradictions inherent in the country's increasingly diverse communities, ignoring the divisive and exclusionary aspects of social capital, and transforming active citizenship from 'the right to have rights' as Isin and Wood (1999) put it, to an apolitical, disembodied project of self-help and self-reliance. In a rapidly transformed Ireland, the key question is why. To answer this question and thus understand more comprehensively the conceptual revisioning that is taking place under the guise of active citizenship, we need to look beyond our own communities to our situation within the wider global economy. It is to these rapidly changed circumstances we now turn. (2001) and Held and McGrew (2003) argues that contemporary globalisation invites a significant rethinking of democratic theory, most especially in respect of traditional accounts of liberal democracy and the role and influence of both the state and civil society therein.
Two main issues are readily apparent from these developments. The first is that states' roles and monopolies of power have significantly altered. While once states exercised exclusive political authority within their national boundaries, delivering fundamental goods and services to their citizens, they now share this authority with networks of international agencies and institutions including bodies such as the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and transnational business corporations. Thus, while the Irish sate, as a strongly capitalist state, has long negotiated its authority with domestic capitalist interests, this authority is now far more widely and broadly dispersed. The second implication arises inevitably from the first. With state authority declining within this widening web wherein the 'visible presence of rule' is replaced with the 'invisible government' of corporations, banks and international organisations (Held and McGrew, 2003: 10) Held and McGrew (2003: 13) Ireland corresponds closely to these conceptualisations. The country's high level of dependence on foreign direct investment leaves it highly exposed to the vagaries of global financial markets and mobile capital (O'Hearn, 1999 , Kirby, 2004 . Within this context the state's traditional role and source of legitimacy in maintaining existing levels of social protection in delivering fundamental goods and services to its citizens is challenged (see Kirby, 2004) . This is further exacerbated by the congruence of globalisation with growing levels of inequality within Irish society (see Jacobson and Kirby, 2006 , Hardiman, McCashin and Payne, 2004 and Kirby, 2004 as elsewhere (Castells, 2004 , UNDP, 1999 .
Allied to this is a growing disillusionment with political leadership as evidenced in falling voting rates (Laver, 2005) and widespread evidence of political corruption (Collins and Quinlivan, 2005 On the other hand, states attempt to regain legitimacy domestically and represent the increasing social diversity of their constituencies through processes of decentralisation and the devolution of power and resources nationally (Castells, 2004: 340) in attempts to improve the living standards for the large majority of the population. This is achieved by building 'civil society' at local level, both formally, With its role as social protector thus compromised, the Irish state is seeking to transfer this role to the community and voluntary sector through the fostering of self-help initiatives within local communities. This is laid out in the government's White Paper published in 2000 (Ireland, 2000: 23, paragraphs 3.13-3.14) . Within this paper, the State is described as 'not the answer to every problem, but just one player among others ' (2000: 9) , with the government's vision of the community and voluntary sector described as being 'one which encourages people and communities to look after their own needs -very often in partnership with statutory agencies -but without depending on the state to meet all needs ' (2000: 10) . With a firm focus (in both policy and funding terms) on harnessing community energy, resources and goodwill, in other words in attempting to minimise the social fallout of the global development project, the Irish state is not devolving power as Castells suggests however. On the contrary, in exhorting communities to address their own needs while simultaneously denying them a voice in querying how these needs have come about, the state is effectively depoliticising the community sphere. It is by no means alone in this however. In their political and professional rapprochements to the state, a range of civic organisations have become complicit in supporting this depoliticisation.
Bolstered by the political and financial capital gained through such relations, the core political tenets of community development appear to be lost. With a powerful and well-resourced range of actors, state and civic alike, actively de-activating citizenship around the country, control and decisions over development policy -policy constrained within the confines of the broader global financial architecture -remain in Dublin while communities suffering the brunt of these decisions are urged to simply get on with it. In ignoring the explicitly political dimensions of citizenship and glossing over the socially divisive potential of efforts to enhance social capital, the recent campaign for active citizenship is a misnomer in that, in reality, it seeks to de-activate citizenship (in the republican tradition of the concept), in the process depoliticising the community sector.
Conclusion
While, for a period, the hyperbole of the Celtic Tiger era successfully drowned growing empirical evidence of growing inequality and marginalisation, reducing it at best to murmured concerns about so-called 'supply-side' issues threatening our much celebrated growth, the global financial crisis has revealed the exceedingly shaky foundations upon which such hyperbole was based. With unprecedented job losses and associated pressures and stress affecting communities across the country all is clearly not well, nor has it been for some time. At this moment in time, when the significant failings of the current development model are clear to all, there is an
